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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Gertrude Abramson appeals the summary judgment 
granted to her former employer, William Paterson College 
("WPC"),1 against whom she filed hostile work environment, 
religious discrimination, and unlawful retaliation claims 
under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination ("NJLAD"). Abramson, former tenure-track 
Associate Professor in the Department of Curriculum & 
Instruction ("C&I") of the School of Education at WPC, 
claimed she was subjected to harassment and ultimately 
terminated, both because of her Orthodox Jewish beliefs 
and practices, and because she complained of WPC's 
religious discrimination against her. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of WPC on all claims, 
and Abramson now appeals. We conclude that Abramson 
established a prima facie case for all three causes of action, 
and that the District Court erred in the way that it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. WPC, now the William Paterson University of New Jersey, is an 
undergraduate and graduate educational institution, and is a state 
college of New Jersey. 
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considered the evidence and applied certain legal principles. 
We will therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
A. Facts 
 
Most of the underlying facts are undisputed. Where there 
is a dispute, we view the facts in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp. , 904 F.2d 
853, 854 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). WPC hired Abramson, an 
Orthodox Jew, for one year as a tenure-track Associate 
Professor, effective September 1, 1990. Abramson has a 
Doctor of Education degree in Communications, Computing 
and Technology from Columbia University, and New York 
State teacher certifications in elementary education and 
early childhood education. In 1990, she had been teaching 
for ten years at the college level, had published in peer- 
reviewed academic publications, and had a national 
reputation in education technology. At the time WPC hired 
her until her termination, Abramson was the only Orthodox 
Jew employed in the School of Education at WPC. 
 
At the start of her first year at WPC, Abramson informed 
her Department Chair, Jim Peer, that she would not be able 
to teach on Jewish holidays. He suggested that she work 
out her schedule with her students, which she did, and the 
days she missed on account of Jewish holidays were not 
counted as sick days. App. at 134-35. 
 
The Review Process 
 
As part of WPC's written policies and procedures 
regarding retention and tenure, an untenured professor's 
academic performance was to be reviewed on an annual 
basis. New Jersey state law does not allow a state college to 
offer tenure to a faculty member upon appointment, but 
does permit it to offer tenure to a professor after two years 
of employment upon a showing of extraordinary 
circumstances. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 18A:60-9 (West 1993). 
Barring exceptional circumstances, an untenured faculty 
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member must serve five years before being considered in 
the fifth year for an award of tenure made effective in his 
or her sixth year of employment. Id. atS 18A:60-8. 
 
Retention and tenure decisions in Abramson's 
department are first considered by the Curriculum and 
Instruction Retention Committee ("the Committee"). The 
criteria used to determine retention and tenure, as set forth 
in WPC's written retention policy, are as follows: (1) 
professional performance; (2) professional growth; and (3) 
potential contributions to the academic department and the 
University in terms of present and future programs. The 
Department Chair is an ex-officio member of the 
Committee. Though not a voting member, the Chair does 
choose whether or not to sign the Committee's 
recommendation. App. at 707. By not signing a 
recommendation, the Chair indicates a lack of support for 
the Committee's evaluation. App. at 708. The Dean then 
makes a recommendation to the Provost. Finally, the 
President of WPC makes a determination whether or not to 
recommend retention (or tenure, where applicable) to the 
Board of Trustees. The WPC Board of Trustees then decides 
whether to retain and/or grant tenure based on the 
recommendation of the President. 
 
Abramson's First Two Years at WPC 
 
Abramson's first "annual" review occurred shortly after 
she began teaching at WPC, and on November 7, 1990, the 
Committee "strongly" recommended the retention of 
Abramson for the 1991-92 academic year. App. at 203. The 
Committee applauded her teaching, scholarly achievement 
and service, and noted Abramson's ability to teach many 
C&I courses, opining that "[t]his flexibility makes her most 
valuable for future planning." Id. It went on to say that the 
C&I Department "has long been in need of just such 
expertise as Professor Abramson brings . . . [WPC] stand[s] 
to benefit from her work as a teacher and scholar." Id. 
 
In the fall of 1991, during Abramson's second year at 
WPC, Nancy Seminoff became the Dean of WPC's School of 
Education, and in October 1991, she appointed Shelley 
Wepner to chair the C&I Department. On October 29, 1991, 
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the Committee recommended the retention of Abramson for 
the 1992-93 academic year, and Dean Seminoff concurred. 
The Committee noted Abramson's significant service, top 
teaching ratings by her peer evaluators, and exemplary 
scholarship. It stated that "Professor Abramson exemplifies 
WPC's direction for the future." App. at 207. Once again, it 
strongly recommended her retention, and Wepner signed 
the recommendation. President Speert then recommended 
Abramson's reappointment to the Board of Trustees. App. 
at 204. 
 
Abramson's Third Year at WPC 
 
During Abramson's third year, she began to experience 
difficulties. First, Abramson was charged for sick days for 
each day of work she missed due to Jewish holidays, 
despite the fact that WPC was closed on several Christian 
holidays. App. at 13, 135, 159. In June 1992, after 
Abramson submitted routine forms in connection with a 
professional conference she would be attending during that 
summer, Seminoff required Abramson to meet with her to 
account for the number of conferences and absences in the 
prior year. Linda Dye, the head of the faculty union, stated 
that this was "unprecedented" in a situation where a 
professor's absences had not exceeded the standards set by 
Human Resources. App. at 157-58. 
 
In addition, Abramson was charged a day of sick leave for 
a Jewish holiday on October 20, 1992, when she was not 
even scheduled to teach. App. at 250, 677. After protesting 
orally and in writing, this error was corrected six months 
later. App. at 685. Then, in November 1992, during a C&I 
Department meeting called to plan the 1993-94 class 
schedules, Abramson stated her intention to schedule her 
classes so that they did not conflict with the fall Jewish 
holidays. According to Abramson, "Wepner started to 
scream that she was tired of hearing about [Abramson] and 
[her] holidays; when [Abramson] quietly tried to explain 
[her]self, Chair Wepner yelled that [Abramson's] holidays 
were . . . personal private issues and that she did not want 
them mentioned at the scheduling meetings." App. at 137. 
 
During the fall of 1992, at a Technology Committee 
 
                                5 
  
meeting chaired by Seminoff, Wepner suggested that 
Abramson, along with others, come in on a Saturday to 
prepare a technology room. Wepner, who is Jewish herself, 
made this suggestion while fully aware that Abramson does 
not work on Saturdays. Abramson told the group that she 
could not attend because of the Jewish Sabbath. 2 
Thereafter, Wepner continually questioned Abramson about 
her lack of availability on Friday nights and Saturdays. 
App. at 137-38. 
 
On October 12, 1992, the Committee once again 
recommended Abramson for retention for the 1993-94 
school year. The evaluation highlighted the "dynamic" 
nature of Abramson's discipline, described her as a"caring 
educator" and "reflective teacher," noted she engaged in a 
"wide range of scholarly activity" and was"active in several 
national conferences in her field." App. at 225-28. This 
time, however, the Committee's evaluation noted some 
"minor concern about her teaching performance and her 
contribution to department activities . . . ." App. at 231. 
However, it also "recognized her numerous scholarly 
pursuits and professional contributions" and recommended 
her retention "in light of the department's present and 
future needs for a technology educator." Id.  Wepner signed 
the recommendation. Seminoff, noting "an imbalance in 
productivity" due to Abramson's focus on scholarly activity, 
expressed that she had "serious concerns about Dr. 
Abramson's reappointment," and recommended Abramson 
"with some reservation." App. at 929-30. 
 
On October 22, 1992, Abramson wrote a seven-page 
letter to President Speert, stating that she took"strong 
exception to the negative tenor and substance of the 
recommendations made for [her] retention by[her] 
department and Dean Seminoff." App. at 1253. She went on 
to write, "I have lived as an Orthodox Jew all my life . . . . 
The non-discrimination policy of William Paterson College 
precludes the need to defend either religious observances or 
pursuit of career goals." Id. Abramson attached the July 12, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In conformity with her religious beliefs, Abramson does not work, use 
the telephone or drive a car from sundown on Friday until approximately 
one hour after sundown on Saturday. 
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1992 letter she had sent to Seminoff in response to the 
Dean's request for an explanation of her absences. App. at 
1261. She received no response from Speert, and she has 
asserted that his demeanor toward her changed 
dramatically after that. Instead of being friendly as he was 
previously, he "stopped speaking to [her] and would turn on 
his heel and walk away from [her] if [they] happened to 
meet on campus." App. at 140. On October 30, 1992, 
President Speert informed Abramson that he intended to 
recommend her for retention for a fourth year. App. at 931. 
 
In a March 1993 meeting, Wepner scheduled an annual 
C&I Department lunch for May on a Jewish holiday, even 
after Abramson informed her she could not attend. App. at 
137. On April 1, 1993, Wepner's secretary commented to 
Abramson, in the presence of Wepner, that "other faculty 
members are complaining about the way your religious 
absences inconvenience them"; Wepner did not comment. 
Id. 
 
On April 27, 1993, Abramson sent a letter to Speert, the 
Provost, her union representative, the Chair of the Faculty 
Senate, and the entire Board of Trustees. App. at 939. She 
attached the letter she had written to Seminoff after their 
meeting on March 23, 1993, a meeting that Abramson said 
was another event in a series of "continued and 
unwarranted negativism toward [her]." App. at 940. The 
attached letter refuted Seminoff 's suggestions and 
criticisms regarding Abramson's teaching, leadership, 
professionalism, and collegiality, and said it was written to 
"counter the negative `facts' [Seminoff] continue[d] to 
disseminate about [her]." App. at 939. The letter accused 
Seminoff of having "ill-concealed hostility" toward 
Abramson and of having a management style that "stifles 
collegiality, deprives the departments and the college of 
faculty creativity . . . and reduces innovative and effective 
teaching." App. at 947. Abramson testified in her deposition 
that this letter was sent to "challenge the judgment of the 
Dean." App. at 1070. 
 
On April 28, 1993, Provost Smith wrote a letter to 
Abramson stating that it was highly unprofessional for her 
to circulate such a letter so widely. App. at 1072-73. 
Abramson, however, continued to circulate letters that were 
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harshly critical of Dean Seminoff. On June 7, 1993, she 
wrote a letter to Seminoff attacking her for "applying an 
administrative style that is autocratic and confrontational 
and is based upon an outmoded, discredited, paternalistic, 
approach to management." App. at 1076-77. Abramson's 
letter added, "I have not seen any substantive evidence that 
you are a constructive administrator." App. at 1077. 
Abramson sent copies to Speert and Provost Smith. 
 
On May 6, 1993, at a Technology Committee meeting, 
Seminoff suggested holding a technology conference on a 
Saturday. Abramson explained that she could not 
participate due to the Sabbath. According to Abramson, 
Seminoff screamed at her, saying that if Abramson would 
not run a conference for her on Friday night and Saturday, 
nothing Abramson did would have any value. App. at 137- 
38, 157. And during the 1993-94 academic year, Wepner 
suggested that faculty meetings be moved from Tuesdays, 
the day when they had been held for many years, to Friday 
afternoons, which would conflict with Abramson's 
observance of the Sabbath. App. at 163-64. 
 
Final Review for Retention 
 
On September 20, 1993, five out of seven members of the 
Committee voted to recommend Abramson's retention for a 
fifth year, and for her early tenure. The Committee's report 
stated the following: 
 
       Dr. Abramson is a skilled teacher and instructional 
       designer in the interactive classroom setting. . . . 
       Students also recognize Dr. Abramson's excellence as a 
       teacher/educator. . . . She encourages students to 
       listen, think, and communicate and to develop their 
       intellectual skills. . . . Dr. Abramson's working 
       relationships with faculty are flavored with respect. She 
       is genuinely considerate and thoughtful of others and 
       is willing to assist in any way possible. . . .[She] does 
       her share to further educational and professional 
       meetings. . . . She is a well rounded professional .. . 
       who represents the college admirably . . . . On campus, 
       Dr. Abramson has distinguished herself in a variety of 
       roles. . . . Not only is she a fine scholar, but she is a 
       valued colleague as well. 
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App. at 234-38. The Committee also noted that Abramson 
had an outstanding publication and speaking record, and 
served on many university committees. It stated that she 
had "restructured and expanded the graduate 
concentration in technology education . . . ." App. at 239. 
It also discussed the future goals of the institution with 
respect to her field of expertise, finding that she was in a 
position to help WPC attain those goals. It stressed 
Abramson's networking abilities and her status as a 
"nationally recognized leader in her field," calling her "a 
valuable resource and an asset to the College." Id. 
 
The two other voting members of the committee, Aitken 
and Coletta, were not present at the meeting. Wepner was 
also absent. On September 23, 1993, Aitken, Coletta and 
Wepner appended comments to the Committee's 
recommendation. Aitken wrote that she had "reservations 
regarding the [C]ommittee's recommendation," while Coletta 
and Wepner noted that they did "not agree with the 
Committee's recommendation." App. at 974. 
 
Seminoff then wrote a memorandum to the Provost, 
stating that she did not recommend Abramson's retention. 
She cited concerns with three of the four applicable criteria 
for retention and tenure -- teaching, research/scholarly 
activity and service. App. at 975. Speert then undertook an 
analysis of Abramson's retention folder. 
 
On September 22, 1993, Abramson wrote a letter to 
Robie Cagnina, WPC's Affirmative Action Officer, stating in 
part: "This is the . . . third [year] in which religious 
discrimination has been directed at me. I am being 
subjected to bias, discriminatory treatment, harrassment 
[sic], and outright hatred because I live as an Orthodox 
Jew." App. at 311. At the bottom of the letter, Cagnina 
wrote the following: "September 22, 1993 Met with Dr. 
Abramson regarding this issue; discussed options for the 
filing of a complaint. Choice was to file with the Division of 
Civil Rights. RSC" Id. 
 
On October 13, 1993, Wepner complained to Abramson, 
during a lengthy attack on her professional contribution 
during a graduate curriculum meeting: "[T]he trouble with 
you is that it doesn't show that you are Orthodox." App. at 
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138. During the following week, Abramson sent a letter to 
Speert, asking that, in light of Seminoff 's negative 
recommendation, he read her retention materials carefully. 
She wrote: "It appears that [Seminoff 's] bias against me as 
an Orthodox Jew overwhelms her professional judgment." 
App. at 377. On October 25, 1993, nearly two weeks later, 
Speert wrote Abramson a letter informing her that he did 
not intend to recommend her reappointment. App. at 977. 
He later expressed the reasons for his decision in a 
memorandum, sent to her on November 12, 1993. It 
appears clear from the memorandum that his reasons 
differed from Seminoff 's. In Speert's opinion, Abramson's 
"potential contribution to her Department, Program and the 
College . . . [did] not justify reappointment." App. at 979. 
 
Abramson then went through an appeals process, but 
Speert reached the same conclusion once again. In his 
deposition, he explained his reasons for not retaining 
Abramson. Speert said that the main reason was that the 
retention folder presented to him contained evidence of her 
inability to take leadership and guidance. App. at 1098. He 
clarified that the referred-to evidence involved issues 
related both to grants and to the accreditation visit by the 
National Council on the Accreditation of Teachers of 
Education ("NCATE").3 He also noted that Abramson had 
failed to create a concentration in technology and refused to 
work with administrators to create an Apple computer lab. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Speert testified in his deposition that Abramson dealt with a grant for 
Merck and a program with the Stevens Institute of Technology in a way 
that was "not consonant with college processes." App. at 1102. He stated 
that "her view with respect to the [Merck] grant was limiting and did not 
take into account either circumstances at the school level or college 
level 
or any level." App. at 1101. With respect to a proposed program with 
Stevens, he said that "Dr. Abramson's response to the issue was 
centered about individuals and not centered about the program, the 
program gains with respect to the college and the college's cost benefit 
analysis with respect to that program." App. at 1107. Regarding the 
NCATE accreditation, Speert testified that he was referring to 
Abramson's complaints about not being placed on the steering 
committee, and her refusal to participate in the preparation for the 
accreditation visit after being excluded from the steering committee. App. 
at 1107-09. 
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Other Evidence Offered 
 
Abramson also offered affidavits from several WPC faculty 
members. The affidavit of Linda Dye, WPC professor and 
president of the faculty union from 1993-94, supported 
many of Abramson's allegations. She stated that Speert had 
refused to say at Abramson's appeal meeting why she was 
terminated, App. at 159, and also that the reasons given by 
WPC could all be refuted, App. at 160-61. She declared the 
following: 
 
       All but three or four faculty members in the School of 
       Education had difficulties with Dean Seminoff. Even 
       within that context, Dean Seminoff 's conduct toward 
       Professor Abramson stood out for its personal hostility. 
       In contrast to her treatment of other faculty members, 
       Dean Seminoff required Professor Abramson to justify 
       every one of her actions in each and every area of 
       Professor Abramson's work . . . . Dean Seminoff 's 
       criticisms of Professor Abramson's performance were 
       without basis . . . . Especially notable was her 
       insistence that Professor Abramson be excluded from 
       the committee preparing the School of Education for an 
       accreditation visit by a team from [NCATE], since 
       Professor Abramson had special expertise as she was a 
       member of NCATE . . . . Seminoff 's unfair criticism of 
       Professor Abramson's performance and her hostile 
       conduct toward Professor Abramson were motivated by 
       her disapproval of Professor Abramson's strict 
       adherence to Jewish religious laws . . . . 
 
App. at 156-57. 
 
The affidavit of Stanley Wollock, a tenured professor in 
Abramson's department, noted that Friday afternoon 
meetings were changed because "Wepner was aware that 
Professor Abramson was unable to attend . . . because of 
her observance of the Jewish Sabbath." App. at 163. He 
also recounted that Wepner had stated that Abramson 
"would not be fulfilling her duties" if she did not attend the 
faculty meetings. App. at 164. In addition, he noted that 
Dean Seminoff said "you people" to Abramson more than 
once and treated her "much more harshly than she treated 
other faculty members." Id. According to his observations, 
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he believed the Dean's dislike of Abramson was based on 
her religion. App. at 165. 
 
Doris White, a tenured professor in Abramson's 
department who was a member of the Retention and 
Tenure Committee in the Fall of 1993, stated, "Dean 
Seminoff was prejudiced against Jews," assigning both 
Abramson and another untenured Jewish faculty member 
to work on many Friday nights, though White was never 
asked to teach on a Friday night. App. at 168. She also 
declared that faculty meetings were only scheduled on 
Fridays while Abramson was in the C&I Department. Id. 
Additionally, White stated that Abramson had more 
technological expertise and had published more than the 
rest of the faculty in the C&I Department. App. at 167. 
 
Finally, Abramson submitted the declaration of her 
former colleague, Cordelia Towney. Abramson and Towney 
had both been on the faculty at a different college earlier in 
their careers, and had worked on a book together while 
Abramson worked at WPC. WPC had also employed Towney 
for one semester. Towney stated that "[t]he religious 
harassment which [Abramson] suffered at WPC made her 
feel like a beaten puppy. She became sallow, stooped, [and] 
she looked broken." App. at 174. 
 
In addition to these declarations and her own affidavit, 
Abramson submitted a Post-It note written by Wepner that 
was contained in Abramson's file. App. at 445. The note 
said, "If you are dealing with grad program teachers - work 
all day -- Logical for any working class college to have 
conferences on Sat[urday] - needs of institution conflict 
with her practicing religion -- go. Conferences on Saturday 
to deal." Id. Abramson also introduced into evidence 
extremely positive student evaluations she had received 
during the 1992-93 academic year, faculty evaluation forms 
completed between April 1992 and May 1993 praising her 
work,4 as well as ten letters written to Speert by students 
and faculty members who strongly supported her retention. 
App. at 183-85, 347-62, 380-93. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. One peer review was much more critical of Abramson than the others; 
this was written by Wepner. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
On November 3, 1993, Abramson filed a complaint of 
employment discrimination with both the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the 
New Jersey Division on Civil Rights ("NJDCR"). App. at 141. 
After filing a grievance with her union that was eventually 
denied, Abramson filed a complaint of religious 
discrimination and retaliation with the NJDCR and the 
EEOC on September 2, 1994. After receiving a right to sue 
letter from the EEOC, Abramson commenced this action in 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey on August 17, 1995. 
 
The District Court delivered its summary judgment ruling 
from the bench on December 10, 1999, disposing of the 
issues raised in a lengthy oral opinion that was 
interspersed with dialogue between the Court and counsel. 
The Court entered its order on December 14, 1999, 
granting summary judgment in favor of WPC on all claims. 
In its oral opinion, the District Court briefly considered 
Abramson's hostile work environment claim, rejecting it 
because it found that Abramson did not present evidence 
that would satisfy the prima facie case. The Court focused 
primarily on Abramson's failure to make out the first 
element of the prima facie case: intentional discrimination 
on the basis of religion. In its view, there were too many 
other explanations for Wepner's conduct, making the 
religious animus explanation unreasonable. Dist. Ct. Op. at 
78-79. Furthermore, it stated that the "same evidence 
works for both" discrimination and hostile work 
environment claims, and indicated it was considering 
Abramson's inability to prove pretext in its analysis of her 
hostile work environment claim. Id. at 77-78. Overall, it 
found that "at best, [Abramson] raises a scintilla of 
evidence." Id. at 83. 
 
The vast majority of the District Court opinion addressed 
Abramson's religious discrimination claim. The District 
Court was unpersuaded by the evidence relied on by 
Abramson to support her claim, though it did not refer at 
all to the declarations submitted by Abramson's fellow 
professors. It stated that because the Committee voted to 
grant Abramson tenure, the focus of the inquiry should be 
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on whether President Speert failed to make a tenure 
decision because of discriminatory animus. It found that 
there was no evidence of such animus. Id. at 81-82. The 
Court held that "at best [Abramson] raises a scintilla of 
evidence in the overall inquiry, by virtue of what the record 
reveals concerning the mind of Shelly Wepner." Id. at 83. In 
addition, the Court found that Abramson had failed to 
establish that WPC's reasons for terminating her were 
pretextual. Id. 
 
The District Court dismissed the comments made about 
Abramson's religion as "stray remarks." Id. at 30. The Court 
opined that there was a lack of evidence that people acted 
negatively toward Abramson because of her religious 
absences. Id. at 58-59. The Court expressed its belief that 
Wepner was "hotheaded" and that her bad treatment of 
Abramson was unrelated to religion. Id. at 59-60, 78. 
 
The District Court then examined Wepner's statement to 
Abramson ("The trouble with you is that it doesn't show 
that you are Orthodox.") at length, acknowledging that it 
sounded "angry" and "confrontative"[sic]. Id. at 52. 
However, after reading Wepner's deposition, the Court 
"gleaned from that a position that [Wepner] as a Jew has, 
which is that she felt that her own religious practices were 
down-played [sic] and low-keyed by her, as a matter of her 
dealing with the issue of possible Antisemitism . . . ." Id. at 
53. The District Court asked whether or not Wepner's 
remark, "standing alone . . . establishes a religious bias," 
and found that "[t]here's just no way I find for someone to 
hear Shelly Wepner's remark and draw any kind of an 
inference that that per se remark is evidence of 
discriminatory animus towards Abramson . . . ." Id. at 53- 
55. Instead, it determined that it only showed a"clear 
difference of opinion with respect to Abramson's open 
acknowledgment and requests for acknowledgment of her 
Orthodoxy . . . ." Id. at 55. 
 
The District Court then addressed Wepner's Post-It as a 
"stand-alone document to give us a vision of Shelly 
Wepner's mind-set [sic] with respect to Abramson." Id. The 
Court was persuaded that the note "establishes even more 
strongly that Wepner moved from a difference of opinion 
with plaintiff regarding the practice of her religion and 
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broadened that in her mind to a conclusion that . . . 
Abramson was not . . . going to meet the needs of the 
institution." Id. at 56. However, the Court found that 
Abramson had failed to show the requisite nexus between 
Wepner's Post-It and WPC's decision not to retain her 
because it was "not contextually established where, when 
and how this Post-[I]t played a role in anything other than 
Wepner's own dossier regarding the plaintiff." Id. Although 
the Court noted that it was possible that Wepner somehow 
influenced Speert, it found that a possibility was 
insufficient: "there has to be proof of a determinative factor, 
i.e. factor of discrimination. Not the possibility." Id. at 57. 
 
The District Court was similarly unconvinced that 
Abramson's absence from Friday faculty meetings affected 
her job performance, and it also rejected the argument that 
the rescheduling of faculty meetings was done in an effort 
to harass Abramson or to discriminate against her. 
Furthermore, the Court did not believe that Seminoff 's 
request that Abramson account for her absences was 
related to religion. It ascribed her being charged with a sick 
day on a Jewish holiday when she was not scheduled to 
teach, and the six-month delay in correcting it, to 
"administrative and bureaucratic bumbling." Id. at 69. The 
Court stated that it was considering the record as a whole, 
and in doing so, it found that Abramson did not disprove 
the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason WPC gave for not 
retaining Abramson. Id. at 83. 
 
In rejecting Abramson's retaliation claim, the District 
Court held Abramson did not give "a clear enough 
indication that she was raising religious discrimination as 
an issue." Id. at 76. The Court considered only Speert's 
alleged change in demeanor when evaluating the adverse 
employment action prong of the retaliatory inquiry, and 
held that "whatever Speert did or didn't do with respect to 
friendliness would call for rank speculation on the part of 
the jury, if that jury was asked to say or to find that there 
was retaliation." Id. The District Court did not consider 
Abramson's ultimate termination as an adverse 
employment action. 
 
Abramson appeals, arguing that the District Court erred 
in dismissing her Title VII and NJLAD religious 
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discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation 
claims. She argues that she established a prima facie case 
for each of her claims. First, she argues that she has 
recounted sufficient proof of all elements of the prima facie 
case required for a hostile work environment claim. With 
respect to her religious discrimination claim, Abramson 
stresses that she submitted ample evidence that her 
supervisors were motivated by discriminatory animus 
stemming from her insistence that she be allowed to 
practice her Orthodox Jewish beliefs. She also argues that 
she presented credible evidence that WPC's reasons for 
terminating her were pretextual. With regard to her 
retaliation claim, Abramson contends that the record 
clearly reflects that she made her supervisors aware that 
she was complaining of discrimination, and that her 
termination was motivated by those complaints. We will 
consider each of Abramson's claims in the order raised by 
appellant, beginning with her hostile work environment 
claim. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 28 U.S.C. S 1343, and supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have appellate 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to WPC, and we apply the same 
standard that the District Court should have applied. 
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 
2000). A court should grant summary judgment "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In evaluating the evidence, "a 
court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's 
favor." Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278. While the individual pieces 
of evidence alone may not suffice to make out the claims 
asserted, we must view the record as a whole picture. 
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 
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1997). As we stated in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 
F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990), "A play cannot be 
understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on 
its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination 
analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but 
on the overall scenario." 
 
A. Hostile Work Environment 
 
Abramson's first claim is that she was subjected to a 
hostile work environment based on her religion. To make 
out a prima facie case for a religiously hostile work 
environment5 under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
five elements: "(1) the employee[ ] suffered intentional 
discrimination because of [religion]; (2) the discrimination 
was pervasive and regular;6 (3) the discrimination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We have yet to address a hostile work environment claim based on 
religion. However, Title VII has been construed under our case law to 
support claims of a hostile work environment with respect to other 
categories (i.e., sex, race, national origin). We see no reason to treat 
Abramson's hostile work environment claim any differently, given Title 
VII's language. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers from 
discriminating against an individual because of"race, color, religion, 
sex, 
or national origin."). Therefore, we apply the well-established framework 
for hostile work environment claims with respect to other protected 
categories to our analysis of a hostile work environment claim made on 
account of religion. We also note that there is at least one reported 
decision from a court of appeals that has held that a claim for a hostile 
work environment based on religion exists, and applied the same prima 
facie case we use here. See Hafford v. Seidner , 183 F.3d 506, 514 (6th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff "did not demonstrate a triable issue 
over 
whether he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on 
religion."). 
 
We also note that a New Jersey court has also recognized that hostile 
work environment claims based on religion are cognizable under the 
NJLAD. See Heitzman v. Monmouth County, 728 A.2d 297, 303 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (discussing plaintiff 's claim that he was 
subjected to hostile work environment because he was Jewish and 
noting that New Jersey courts have relied upon federal court decisions 
construing Title VII hostile work environment claims when reviewing 
such claims under NJLAD). 
 
6. We note, as we did in Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1994), and Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 449 n.14 (3d Cir. 
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detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination 
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same 
[religion] in that position; and (5) the existence of 
respondeat superior liability." Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Andrews, 895 
F.2d at 1482). 
 
Under the NJLAD, a plaintiff states a claim for a 
religiously hostile work environment by showing that the 
"complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for 
the employee's [religion]; and it was (2) severe or pervasive 
enough to make a (3) reasonable [Orthodox Jew] believe 
that (4) the conditions of employment were altered and the 
working environment was hostile or abusive." Hurley v. 
Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 114 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000) (quoting Lehmann v. 
Toys R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993)). 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1994), that the Andrews formulation of this prong differs from the 
Supreme Court's. In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), 
and most recently in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 
75, 78 (1998), the Supreme Court articulated the standard for hostile 
work environment claims. It required that the plaintiff demonstrate that 
the harassment was "severe or pervasive." Id. On at least one previous 
occasion, we have also referred to the standard as severe or pervasive. 
See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 
667 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Title VII hostile work environment test to 
ADA harassment claim and holding that plaintiff failed to "demonstrate[ ] 
that the asserted harassment was pervasive or severe enough to meet 
the Harris standard."). In the instant case, Abramson asserts a claim 
that the discrimination was "pervasive and regular," thus fulfilling both 
the Andrews and the Harris tests. Therefore, we adopt the approach 
taken in Bouton. We note that the distinction between "severe or 
pervasive" and "pervasive and regular" may be important, but "do not 
find it necessary to resolve whether [the difference in language] was 
inadvertent." Bouton, 29 F.3d at 106 n.2. 
 
7. New Jersey courts have placed a less onerous burden on the plaintiff 
by omitting the final prong of the analysis. Therefore, any plaintiff who 
has fulfilled the Title VII prima facie case will have also shown the 
elements required by the NJLAD. Because we find that Abramson has 
fulfilled the Title VII prima facie case, we will not discuss the NJLAD 
specifically, but note here that Abramson's claims under the NJLAD are 
intact based on her showing under Title VII. 
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The District Court rejected Abramson's religiously hostile 
work environment claims under both statutes, finding that 
the conduct alleged did not meet the requirements of the 
prima facie case. Dist. Ct. Op. at 78. Though it referred to 
all of the first four prongs of the test, the Court seemed to 
base its holding almost exclusively on Abramson's failure to 
meet the first prong, viewing that prong as involving the 
perception of a "reasonable person of the protected status" 
and requiring a discriminatory "animus." We disagree with 
this approach. 
 
The proper inquiry at this stage was whether a 
reasonable factfinder could view the evidence as showing 
that Abramson's treatment was attributable to her religious 
faith and practice. Further, by asking whether a reasonable 
person would "necessarily construe" the conduct in 
question as being improperly motivated, the District Court 
appears to have viewed the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party making, not the party opposing, the 
summary judgment motion. See Howley v. Town of 
Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2000) ("It is not the 
province of the court itself to decide what inferences should 
be drawn."). 
 
By requiring that Wepner's conduct be "linked" to a 
"discriminatory animus," Dist. Ct. Op. at 79, and stating 
that the record did not sufficiently "reveal[ ] [what was in 
the] mind of Shelley Wepner," id. at 83, the District Court 
seemingly required Abramson to introduce direct evidence 
of Wepner's intentional discrimination against her based on 
her religious beliefs. However, Supreme Court precedent 
does not support the need for a plaintiff to demonstrate 
direct evidence of her harasser's motivation for 
discrimination against her. In Oncale, the Court discussed 
a hostile work environment claim on the basis of sex, and 
stated the following: 
 
       A trier of fact might reasonably find [sex] 
       discrimination, for example, if a female victim is 
       harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by 
       another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is 
       motivated by general hostility to the presence of women 
       in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may 
       also . . . offer direct comparative evidence about how 
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       the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in 
       a mixed-sex workplace. 
 
523 U.S. at 80-81. Similarly, we have never required a 
plaintiff to demonstrate direct proof that her harasser's 
intent was to create a discriminatory environment. Instead, 
we have held that, with respect to certain conduct, the 
intent to discriminate can be inferred. Andrews , 895 F.2d 
at 1482 n.3 (referring to sexual misconduct). We have also 
noted that because discrimination is "often simply masked 
in more subtle forms," it is often difficult to discern 
discriminatory animus. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 
85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Iadimarco v. 
Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The Supreme 
Court has recognized that an employer who discriminates 
will almost never announce a discriminatory animus or 
provide employees or courts with direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent."). Thus, we have held that even the 
use of "code words" such as "all of you" and "one of them" 
could be sufficient evidence from which a jury could find an 
intent to discriminate. See Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083 ("The 
words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal -- 
the intent of the speaker."); see also Howley , 217 F.3d at 
145, 148, 154-55 (finding hostile work environment claim 
on basis of sex viable where conduct at issue, though 
lacking any sexual component or reference to plaintiff 's 
sex, could, in context, reasonably be interpreted as having 
been directed at plaintiff because of sex). 
 
The first prong of the Andrews test was not designed to 
protect harassers who fail to recognize the hostile or 
abusive nature of their comments and actions. Our case 
law does not indicate that the first prong requires a 
factfinder to peer inside the harasser's mind. Rather, it 
merely requires a showing that the offender's behavior was, 
as required by both Title VII and the LAD, based on a 
protected category. See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 
447-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that though facts before us 
did not include evidence of "blatantly sexist behavior," 
plaintiff made out the first element "by showing that gender 
was a substantial factor in the discrimination" and that 
plaintiff would not have been treated in the same manner 
if she were male) (internal quotation marks and citation 
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omitted); Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 862 ("[E]vidence of a 
sufficiently oppressive environment could, in theory, give 
courts enough evidence to infer that the intentional 
discrimination prong of the Andrews test can be met even 
absent evidence of the harasser's subjective intent to 
discriminate.") 
 
Regardless of what a harasser's intention is, if a plaintiff 
presents sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of 
discrimination by offering proof that her "workplace is 
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim's employment and create an 
abusive working environment," Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted), and the conduct is based on one of the 
categories protected under Title VII, a hostile work 
environment claim will survive summary judgment. Here, 
almost all of the incidents alleged centered around 
Abramson's insistence that she not work during the 
Sabbath. Therefore, we hold that where, as here, the 
evidence tends to show that the harasser's conduct was 
intentionally directed toward the plaintiff because of her 
religion, the first prong of the prima facie case is met. 
 
Turning to the remaining elements of the prima facie case 
for hostile work environment, we find that the evidence 
Abramson presented was sufficient to satisfy her burden on 
the other prongs as well. We conclude that the many 
incidents recounted by Abramson, coupled with the 
declarations of other WPC professors, are relevant and 
probative as to prongs two through four of the prima facie 
case for hostile work environment claims.8  Though we will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note that the parties disagree as to the District Court's treatment 
of the declarations, and we found the record quite vague in this regard. 
The District Court clearly did not allude to them in its oral opinion, but 
did make a general statement during oral argument on the summary 
judgment motion, offering the view that "some of the affidavits . . . 
would 
be truly inadmissible." Tr. of Oral Arg. at 100. It then stated that "we 
might have [an] [in] limine battle about that . . . when we are dealing 
with whether or not it is admissible." Id.  at 101. Because we have not 
been referred to a motion contesting their admissibility or an order 
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address each prong individually, first, we briefly note the 
evidence that the District Court should have considered 
when ruling on Abramson's hostile work environment claim:9 
(1) Seminoff 's "unprecedented" monitoring of Abramson's 
conferences and absences; (2) WPC charging Abramson 
with a sick day on a Jewish holiday when she was not 
scheduled to teach; (3) both Wepner and Seminoff, on 
separate occasions, criticizing and raising their voices at 
Abramson regarding her lack of availability during the 
Sabbath; (4) Wepner scheduling meetings on Jewish 
holidays and refusing to change them so Abramson could 
attend; (5) Wepner's pointed statement to Abramson 
regarding her faith and behavior ("The trouble with you is 
that it doesn't show that you are Orthodox."). 
 
First, a jury could find that the harassment was 
pervasive. The events alleged occurred over a period of two 
years and could be found to have infected Abramson's work 
experience; even other faculty members mentioned it to 
Speert prior to Abramson's filing suit. App. at 390-91, 513, 
540-41. No one event alone stands out from the rest, but 
all of the events could be found to aggregate to create an 
environment hostile to a person of Abramson's religion. See 
Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 
1999) ("[I]t is settled law that courts should not consider 
each incident of harassment in isolation. Rather, a court 
must evaluate the sum total of abuse over time.") (internal 
citation omitted). Taken as a whole, all the events alleged 
indicate that the harassment rose to the level of 
pervasiveness required to withstand summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ruling them inadmissible, we assume for our purposes that they are to 
be considered. However, we note that their admissibility is a matter for 
the District Court to decide. See United States Sec. and Exchange 
Comm'n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 198 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(reviewing the exclusion of lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 for 
abuse of discretion); United States v. Eufrasio , 935 F.2d 553, 571 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (stating that admission under Rule 403 is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard). 
 
9. This list is not exhaustive. There are additional examples in the 
record. 
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A jury could also reasonably conclude that Abramson 
was detrimentally affected by the environment, thereby 
fulfilling the third prong. Abramson's declarations amply 
support such a finding, as do the three affidavits of her 
fellow WPC faculty members. In addition, the declaration of 
Cordelia Towney stated that "[t]he religious harassment 
which [Abramson] suffered at WPC made her feel like a 
beaten puppy. She became sallow, stooped, [and] she 
looked broken." App. at 174. 
 
In determining whether the fourth prong, the objective 
test, is met,10 we must "look[ ] at all the circumstances. 
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory 
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work 
performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The Supreme Court 
has stated that Title VII is not violated by the"mere 
utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive 
feelings in an employee" or by mere "discourtesy or 
rudeness," unless so severe or pervasive as to constitute an 
objective change in the conditions of employment. Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). The conduct in the 
instant case could be said to go beyond "simple teasing, 
offhand comments, and [non-serious] isolated incidents," 
which the Supreme Court has cautioned would "not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and 
conditions of employment." Id. at 788 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). We find that Abramson has 
made a sufficient showing, based upon the facts set forth 
above, that a jury could find that a reasonable person of 
her religion would find the conduct alleged to be so harmful 
that it altered her working conditions. 
 
With respect to the fifth prong of the hostile work 
environment claim, the existence of respondeat superior 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We also note that the District Court analyzed whether a reasonable 
Orthodox Jew would find the behavior to be religiously motivated, but in 
assessing whether the fourth prong of the prima facie case is met, a 
court must consider whether or not a person in the protected category 
would be detrimentally affected by the conduct at issue. 
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liability, a jury could also find that this prong has been 
met. The Supreme Court crafted the standard for employer 
liability in Faragher, referred to as the"aided by the agency 
relation test": 
 
       An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a 
       victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
       environment created by a supervisor with immediate 
       (or successively) higher authority over the employee. 
       When no tangible employment action is taken, a 
       defending employee may raise an affirmative defense to 
       liability or damages . . . . No affirmative defense is 
       available, however, when the supervisor's harassment 
       culminates in a tangible employment action, such as 
       discharge . . . . 
 
524 U.S. at 807. Here, it is undisputed that Abramson was 
terminated. Hence, WPC cannot assert an affirmative 
defense, and the evidence of liability is clear. Because 
Abramson presented evidence sufficient to meet all five 
elements of the prima case, we reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment on Abramson's hostile work 
environment claim.11 
 
B. Religious Discrimination Claim 
 
Abramson claims that she was terminated because her 
supervisors were motivated by discriminatory animus 
stemming from her insistence that she be allowed to 
observe her religious holy days. She alleges that WPC's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We also note that the Court erred by conflating two of Abramson's 
legal claims, stating that the exact same evidence applied to both 
Abramson's religious discrimination claim and her hostile work 
environment claim: "[I]f I do not find that .. . the reason advanced were 
[sic] pretextual plaintiff has a difficult time establishing hostile work 
environment . . . the same evidence works for both." Dist. Ct. Op. at 77. 
The two claims have entirely different prima facie cases and often courts 
may consider evidence for one claim and not the other. For example, 
here, even if WPC could demonstrate that it had a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason to terminate Abramson, she would still have a 
hostile work environment claim if she could establish the five prongs of 
the Andrews test, none of which are precluded by a failure to establish 
disparate treatment. 
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various, allegedly non-discriminatory reasons for 
terminating her employment were false and pretextual. 
 
Title VII explicitly protects employees from adverse 
employment actions on the basis of religion: "(a) It shall be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion 
. . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a). As recognized by our sister 
circuits, though never explicitly recognized in our own 
jurisprudence, employees may assert two theories of 
religious discrimination:12 "disparate treatment," as alleged 
here, and "failure to accommodate." E.g. , Chalmers v. Tulon 
Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1368-70 (8th Cir. 1993). 
Because the cases in our court dealing with religious 
discrimination have routinely been of the "failure to 
accommodate" variety, we utilize a prima facie case here 
that differs from the one employed in our other religious 
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & 
Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
To prove a claim under the "disparate treatment" theory, 
the prima facie case and evidentiary burdens of an 
employee alleging religious discrimination mirror those of 
an employee alleging race or sex discrimination. Chalmers, 
101 F.3d at 1017. Accordingly, we apply the familiar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The reason for the two different types of claims is that although 
Title 
VII lists religion in the same list of protected categories as race and 
sex, 
the definition of "religion" in 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) creates the "failure to 
accommodate" theory by including "all aspects of religious observance 
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he 
is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's . . . religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer's business." The prima facie case, considered as part of the 
same framework known as the McDonnell Douglas  test, consists of three 
elements: "(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts 
with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of 
this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the 
conflicting employment requirement." Protos v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-805 (1973). The plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a protected class, 
(2) was qualified and rejected for the position she sought, 
and (3) nonmembers of the protected class were treated 
more favorably. Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 
228 F.3d 313, 318-319 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, 
Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 
1992)). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 
employer must proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment decision. Once the 
employer does so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
proffered reason was pretextual. Goosby, 228 F.3d at 319; 
see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 
U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 
 
Abramson also asserts a claim of religious discrimination 
under the NJLAD. In cases alleging disparate treatment, 
New Jersey courts have adopted a three-step test that 
mirrors the Title VII inquiry: 
 
       (1) the complainant must come forward with sufficient 
       evidence to constitute a prima facie case of 
       discrimination; (2) the employer must then show a 
       legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision; 
       and (3) the complainant must be given the opportunity 
       to show that the employer's stated reason was merely 
       a pretext or discriminatory in its application. 
 
Chou v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 662 A.2d 986, 993 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (citing Dixon v. Rutgers, the State 
Univ. of N.J., 541 A.2d 1046, 1051 (N.J. 1988)). 13 
 
Here, the District Court assumed, and the parties did not 
dispute on appeal, that Abramson met all three 
requirements of the prima facie case: (1) religion is a 
protected category under Title VII and Abramson is an 
Orthodox Jew, (2) she was qualified for the position; and (3) 
she was terminated while other non-Orthodox Jewish 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Under the NJLAD and Title VII, the analysis is essentially the same. 
Therefore, we will limit our discussion to Title VII. In doing so, we note 
that because Abramson's Title VII claim survives summary judgment, 
her NJLAD claim does as well. 
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professors were retained. The burden then shifted to WPC 
to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
Abramson's termination. Goosby, 228 F.3d at 319. WPC 
offered many reasons for its decision. In fact, the reasons 
presented were ever-changing. 
 
Seminoff wrote that after reviewing Abramson's retention 
file, she did not recommend Professor Abramson for 
retention due to concern "regarding the quality of 
accomplishment in [teaching, research, scholarly activity 
and service], with particular concern for the area of 
service." App. at 364. In Speert's memo to Abramson 
explaining his decision not to recommend her for 
reappointment, he wrote that her "overall record of 
contribution to the College and Community and potential 
contribution to the Department, Program and the College in 
terms of present and future programs do not justify 
reappointment." App. at 979. Later, in response to 
Abramson's discrimination complaint to the NJDCR, WPC 
claimed she was deficient in the following areas: 
scholarship and teaching, interpersonal skills during small 
group discussions, professional service on campus-wide 
and department committees/activities, and her scholarly 
record. App. at 404. 
 
Finally, in Speert's deposition, he gave other reasons 
never previously mentioned, among them that Abramson 
failed to create a concentration in technology and refused to 
work with administrators to create an Apple computer lab. 
When pressed, Speert asserted that the main reason he did 
not retain Abramson was that the folder that had been 
presented to him contained evidence of her inability to take 
leadership and guidance. App. at 1098. Upon further 
inquiry, he said that this was based on Abramson's failure 
to follow proper procedures in securing grants, and her 
failure to be involved in the NCATE accreditation process. 
App. at 1099-110. Because WPC's burden at this stage is 
merely a burden of production, we agree with the District 
Court that WPC met its burden at this stage. See Ezold, 
983 F.2d at 523 (referring to defendant's burden as burden 
of production). 
 
The burden shifted to Abramson, who had to "point to 
some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a 
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factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 
employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that 
an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than 
not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's 
action." Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
In Fuentes, we addressed just how much evidence of 
pretext a plaintiff needs to avert summary judgment. We 
held that "to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff 's 
evidence rebutting the employer's proffered legitimate 
reasons must allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that 
each of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons 
was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not 
actually motivate the employment action (that is, the 
proffered reason is a pretext)." Id. (internal citations and 
emphasis omitted). Importantly, we qualified that statement 
with the following footnote: 
 
       [The plaintiff need not] cast doubt on each proffered 
       reason in a vacuum. If the defendant proffers a bagful 
       of legitimate reasons, and the plaintiff manages to cast 
       substantial doubt on a fair number of them, the 
       plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder. That 
       is because the factfinder's rejection of some of the 
       defendant's proffered reasons may impede the 
       employer's credibility seriously enough so that a 
       factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining 
       proffered reasons, even if no evidence undermining 
       those remaining rationales in particular is available. 
 
Id., n.7. We then noted that it is not enough for a plaintiff 
to show that the employer's decision was wrong or 
mistaken, because the issue is whether the employer 
acted with discriminatory animus. Hence, to make a 
sufficient showing of pretext, Abramson must "demonstrate 
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions" in WPC's reasons that "a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them `unworthy 
of credence.' " Id. at 765 (citation omitted). And if Abramson 
can successfully demonstrate pretext, she need not present 
affirmative evidence of discrimination beyond her prima 
facie showing if a rational factfinder could conclude from 
the evidence of pretext that WPC's actions were 
discriminatory. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. 
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WPC's reasons can be grouped into two categories: (1) 
overall deficiencies in Abramson's scholarship, teaching 
and service -- the explanations given to the NJDCR, which 
are the same reasons Seminoff cited as the basis for not 
recommending retention; and (2) Abramson's failure to get 
along with supervisors and follow instructions, which were 
the main (though not exclusive) reasons Speert listed at his 
deposition. 
 
Abramson refutes the first set of reasons by noting that 
Speert admitted in his deposition that these reasons were 
unfounded, saying that her folder gave evidence of"very 
good performance in both areas" of teaching and 
scholarship, App. at 468, and that her level of service 
"would not have raised a concern," App. at 498. In addition, 
WPC admitted at oral argument that these reasons were not 
the actual basis for Abramson's termination. This 
admission alone might suffice to satisfy Abramson's 
burden, but we need not decide based solely on that 
admission, because Abramson's evidence also refutes the 
second set of reasons given later by Speert. 
 
With respect to Abramson's alleged failure to follow 
instructions insofar as she purportedly did not use proper 
protocols for proposed grants and programs, she argues 
that she was unaware of any protocols. App. at 147. She 
points to Speert's inability to identify at his deposition 
where the protocols were outlined in either the policy 
manual or the faculty handbook. App. at 478-79. Abramson 
presented testimony of the president of the faculty union 
stating there were not any protocols, App. at 160, and 
noted WPC's failure to include in the record any documents 
setting forth such protocols. 
 
Abramson also attacked the legitimacy of WPC's reliance 
on the fact that she failed to accept leadership from 
Seminoff and Wepner as grounds for her termination. She 
argues that because these two women were her alleged 
harassers, and because her poor relationship with them 
was directly related to their hostility toward her religion, 
her difficulty working with them should not be credited as 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. 
She also submitted evidence of her positive contributions in 
teaching and scholarship (glowing teaching evaluations, 
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letters to Speert praising her, a fellow professor's 
declaration), including evidence that she was well-versed in 
the use of Apple computers and did in fact teach her 
students how to use them. App. at 132, 174. With respect 
to her alleged failure to develop the concentration in 
technology, Abramson points to the specific reference by 
the Committee to the contrary, presenting evidence that the 
Committee praised her work in this area. App. at 239. In 
addition, Abramson focuses on the timing of the reasons, 
stressing that two technology-related concerns were not 
mentioned until Speert's deposition. 
 
Abramson also argues that the ever-changing nature of 
the proffered reasons can be considered as detracting from 
their legitimacy. We agree. If a plaintiff demonstrates that 
the reasons given for her termination did not remain 
consistent, beginning at the time they were proffered and 
continuing throughout the proceedings, this may be viewed 
as evidence tending to show pretext, though of course it 
should be considered in light of the entire record. See 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (listing "inconsistencies" and 
"contradictions" in employer's reasons among ways plaintiff 
could show pretext); see also Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., 
Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that district 
court could "appropriately" have taken employer's 
inconsistent explanations for termination into account in 
finding causation necessary to satisfy prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge). 
 
We find that based on the record as a whole, Abramson 
has successfully "demonstrate[d] such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions" such that "a factfinder could reasonably . . . 
disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons." 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. And as the Supreme Court 
recently stated in Reeves, this alone could support the 
inference that WPC's motivation was discriminatory: 
 
       In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can 
       reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that 
       the employer is dissembling to cover up a 
       discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is 
       consistent with the general principle of evidence law 
       that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's 
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       dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative 
       evidence of guilt." Moreover, once the employer's 
       justification has been eliminated, discrimination may 
       well be the most likely alternative explanation, 
       especially since the employer is in the best position to 
       put forth the actual reason for its decision. Thus, a 
       plaintiff 's prima facie case, combined with sufficient 
       evidence to find that the employer's asserted 
       justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to 
       conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. 
 
530 U.S. at 147-48 (internal citations omitted). 
 
However, the factfinder does not need to rely on that 
evidence alone. Abramson has also presented evidence from 
which a reasonable factfinder could infer that "an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of [WPC]'s action." 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. The confrontations with Seminoff 
and Wepner, the very probative declarations of Abramson's 
fellow professors, the laudatory faculty evaluations and 
Committee report, and Wepner's Post-it note all provide 
strong evidence to support Abramson's claim. 
 
We note that the District Court appears to have viewed 
the evidence as a factfinder,14 which contributed to the 
ruling. In addition, the District Court seems to have viewed 
each piece of independently, rather than in its entirety.15 "In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. For example, with respect to Abramson being charged for a sick day 
on a Jewish holiday when she was not scheduled to teach, and then 
having to complain for six months to have the error rectified, the 
District 
Court "ascribe[d] that to administrative and bureaucratic bumbling." 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 69. And when discussing Seminoff 's review of 
Abramson's absences and attendance at conferences in July 1992, the 
District Court concluded that such conduct was not motivated by 
discriminatory animus, but rather, Seminoff 's"leadership and part of 
doing the right thing as a manager." Id. at 63. 
 
15. For instance, with respect to the Court's finding as to Wepner's 
comment to Abramson that "The trouble with you is that it doesn't show 
that you are Orthodox," the Court noted: "We are talking about whether 
this standing alone, per se without any tortured reasoning one way or 
another establishes a religious bias." Dist. Ct. Op. at 52-53 (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 55 (stating with respect to Wepner's Post-It note: 
"[T]his is offered as a stand-alone document to give us a vision of Shelly 
Wepner's mind-set with respect to Abramson."). 
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determining the appropriateness of summary judgment, the 
court should not consider the record solely in piecemeal 
fashion, giving credence to innocent explanations for 
individual strands of evidence, for a jury . . . would be 
entitled to view the evidence as a whole." Howley v. Town 
of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, as is required when a defendant moves for 
summary judgment, and viewing the record as a whole, we 
conclude that Abramson's proof is sufficient to require that 
this claim be permitted to proceed to trial. 
 
We note, also, that while the District Court relied heavily 
on the fact that it found no evidence in the record 
demonstrating that Speert himself possessed discriminatory 
animus toward Abramson, a rational jury could find that 
Speert did not make his decision in a vacuum. A 
reasonable inference that could be drawn from the record is 
that Speert was influenced by both Seminoff and Wepner. 
In fact, Speert even stated in his deposition that before 
making his decision not to retain Abramson, he sought 
Seminoff 's counsel. App. at 487. Moreover, there is an 
additional piece of evidence not mentioned in the District 
Court opinion that supports our view of the record on this 
point. The record contains a memo sent on October 21, 
1993, from Seminoff to Speert with a subject line that read: 
"Request for information - Professor Gertrude Abramson," 
thus supporting the conclusion that Speert had sought 
input on the decision to retain Abramson.16 App. at 378. 
Under our case law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting 
discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the 
decision to terminate. See Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 
1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating in ADEA case that if 
plaintiff 's supervisor participated in decision to terminate 
him, even though president of company formally terminated 
him, evidence of supervisor's age-related animus would be 
relevant in determining if discriminatory motive at play); 
see also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In this memo, Seminoff explained certain aspects of Abramson's 
retention file, including why Seminoff believed the committee vote was 
split, and a recitation of what Wepner's concerns were. At the end of the 
memo, Seminoff addresses "the allegation of religious bias." App. at 379. 
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226 (5th Cir. 2000) ("If the employee can demonstrate 
that others had influence or leverage over the official 
decisionmaker . . . it is proper to impute their 
discriminatory attitudes to the formal decisionmaker."); 
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 
46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "discriminatory 
comments . . . made by . . . those in a position to influence 
the decisionmaker" can be evidence of pretext); Griffin v. 
Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) ("[E]vidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where 
the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the 
subordinate's influence."). As we noted in Roebuck v. Drexel 
University, 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 1988),"it is plainly 
permissible for a jury to conclude that an evaluation at any 
level, if based on discrimination, influenced the 
decisionmaking process and thus allowed discrimination to 
infect the ultimate decision." Clearly, Wepner and Seminoff 
played a role in the ultimate decision to terminate 
Abramson, and their involvement thus makes their conduct 
toward her relevant and probative of discriminatory 
animus. 
 
Considering the record before us, we find ample evidence 
to support Abramson's religious discrimination claim. 
 
C. Retaliation Claim 
 
Abramson's third and final claim is for retaliation. To 
advance a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and 
the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the employee 
engaged in a protected employee activity;17 (2) the employer 
took an adverse employment action after or 
contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; 
and (3) a causal link exists between the employee's 
protected activity and the employer's adverse action. See, 
e.g., Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278; see also Krouse v. Am. 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing 
the third requirement as a "causal connection"); Craig v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The actual language used by the New Jersey courts, with respect to 
the first prong, is that an employee must show that he or she engaged 
in protected activity known by the employer. Craig v. Suburban 
Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. 1995) (emphasis added). 
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Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. 1995). 
We conclude that there is ample evidence of all three 
elements in the record, and disagree with the District 
Court's determination that Abramson did not make out a 
prima facie case. 
 
1) Abramson engaged in protected activity. 
 
On Oct. 22, 1992, Abramson wrote a letter to Speert, 
stating: 
 
       I have lived as an Orthodox Jew all my life . . . . The 
       non-discrimination policy of William Paterson College 
       precludes the need to defend either religious 
       observances or pursuit of career goals. Nevertheless, 
       . . . it has been necessary for me to justify my lifestyle. 
       See, for example, the attached memo sent to Dean 
       Seminoff in response to her request for an explanation 
       of my "conferences/absences" when I submitted a pro- 
       forma travel request for an August conference. 
 
App. at 932. On October 12, 1993, Abramson once again 
wrote to Speert after Seminoff gave a negative 
recommendation to the Committee regarding her future 
employment with WPC. App. at 377. This letter complained 
that "Dean Seminoff 's bias against [Abramson] as an 
Orthodox Jew overwhelms her professional judgment." Id. 
In addition to making her complaints known to President 
Speert, Abramson also complained to WPC's Affirmative 
Action Officer, Robie Cagnina. On September 22, 1993, 
Abramson filed a written complaint of religious 
discrimination with Cagnina, stating: "I am being subjected 
to bias, discriminatory treatment, harrassment [sic], and 
outright hatred because I live as an Orthodox Jew." App. at 
311. 
 
The District Court determined that Abramson failed to 
make out the first element, holding that she "did not 
articulate clearly and in a formal manner a religious 
discrimination complaint . . . " and that her"[October]18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The District Court actually stated "April 1992" letter, but given that 
no such letter exists in the record, and that during that same discussion 
it had previously referred to the October 1992 letter, we assume the 
District Court simply misspoke and intended to say October. 
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1992 letter [was not] a clear enough indication that she was 
raising religious discrimination as an issue. She was 
[adverting] to it, but she was not flat out saying it." Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 75-76. Though we think that the October 1992 letter 
was sufficiently clear to have alerted Speert that Abramson 
felt she was being discriminated against,19 we need not rely 
on that letter alone in order to find that Abramson fulfilled 
the first prong.20 This is because not only did Cagnina 
admit that she understood Abramson's September 22, 1993 
letter to her to be an "informal" complaint of discrimination, 
App. at 770, Speert also acknowledged that the October 12, 
1993 letter from Abramson to him complaining of"bias" 
toward her as an Orthodox Jew was quite clearly a 
complaint of discrimination, App. at 515. 
 
Under our precedent, the letters Abramson wrote to 
Cagnina and Speert fall squarely within the requirements of 
the first prong of a retaliation claim. We have previously 
noted in the ADEA context that "we do not require a formal 
letter of complaint to an employer or the EEOC as the only 
acceptable indicia of the requisite `protected conduct' . . . ." 
Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citing Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 
203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that acceptable forms of 
protected activity under Title VII's analogous opposition 
clause include formal charges of discrimination"as well as 
informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, 
including making complaints to management, writing 
critical letters to customers, protesting against 
discrimination by industry or society in general, and 
expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Speert's statements in his deposition regarding this letter are 
inconsistent. First, he notes that he called Wepner after receiving this 
letter and asked her "about the references to challenge on the basis of 
religion," which imply that he realized she was alleging unfair treatment 
due to her religion. App. at 504. Yet, Speert also says that he did not 
consider the letter to be a complaint of religious discrimination. App. at 
507. However, Seminoff did acknowledge in her deposition that she was 
aware that Abramson felt she was the victim of discrimination during the 
1991-92 academic year. App. at 604. 
 
20. It is unclear from the District Court opinion why it did not consider 
any of Abramson's complaints besides the October 1992 letter. 
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charges")). Similarly, here, the complaints to WPC, whether 
oral or written, formal or informal, are sufficient to satisfy 
the first prong of the prima facie case, provided the 
complaints expressed Abramson's opposition to a protected 
activity under Title VII. Thus, we hold that the record 
contains a sufficient showing that Abramson engaged in 
protected activity. 
 
2) Abramson suffered adverse employment action. 
 
With respect to the second element -- i.e., adverse 
employment action, the District Court only focused on 
Abramson's claim that Speert treated her differently after 
she voiced her complaints, rather than considering the 
more obvious adverse employment action of her 
termination. We hold that Abramson's termination clearly 
fulfills the second prong of the prima facie case for a 
retaliation claim. In addition, Seminoff 's recommendation 
not to retain Abramson would also qualify as an adverse 
employment action sufficient to meet this element. 
 
3) A causal link exists between the protected activity 
       and the adverse action. 
 
Given that the District Court viewed Speert's change in 
demeanor as the only adverse action, it dismissed the issue 
of causation out of hand, stating that it "would call for rank 
speculation on the part of the jury" to ask it to find 
retaliation. Dist. Ct. Op. at 76. But because the two 
instances of adverse action we examine are Seminoff 's 
recommendation not to retain Abramson and Abramson's 
ultimate termination, the analysis changes significantly. 
 
Based on our case law and the evidence adduced, 
Abramson has made a sufficient showing of the causal 
connection required by the third prong of the prima facie 
case of retaliation. In Farrell, we recognized that our case 
law has focused on two main factors in finding the causal 
link necessary for retaliation: timing and evidence of 
ongoing antagonism. 206 F.3d at 281; see also Woodson v. 
Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("[T]emporal proximity . . . is sufficient to establish the 
causal link . . . . [A] plaintiff can [also] establish a link 
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between his or her protected behavior and subsequent 
discharge if the employer engaged in a pattern of 
antagonism in the intervening period."). Here, it could be 
argued that the proximity in time between Abramson's last 
letter to Speert on October 12, 1993, and her being 
informed Speert would not recommend her for retention on 
October 25, 1993, is not conclusive because her discharge 
occurred in accordance with her annual review for 
retention. However, the timing factor is made more 
convincing by Cagnina's admission that she called Seminoff 
after meeting with Abramson in September 1993 and told 
her that Abramson had "apprised [her] that she believed 
she had been discriminated against." App. at 770. Seminoff 
wrote a very negative recommendation against Abramson 
soon after that phone call from Cagnina. 
 
In any event, we need not rely on timing alone because 
Abramson has presented additional evidence to prove the 
causal nexus. First, she has demonstrated ongoing 
antagonism from her department head and the dean, as we 
noted in our discussion of the facts above. Further, she 
introduced other types of circumstantial evidence regarding 
WPC's proffered reasons for terminating her, which we have 
previously recognized as potentially probative of a causal 
connection. Farrell, 206 F.3d at 284 ("[A] plaintiff may rely 
upon a broad array of evidence to [illustrate a causal 
link]."). For instance, we have noted that a plaintiff may 
show that her employer gave inconsistent reasons for 
terminating her. See Waddell, 799 F.2d at 73 (stating that 
district court could "appropriately" have taken inconsistent 
explanations into account in finding causation necessary to 
satisfy prima facie case). Revealing discrepancies in the 
proffered reasons can also constitute evidence of the causal 
link. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 285-86 (listing plaintiff 's 
attacks on validity of reasons given). Here, as we found in 
our discussion of the discrimination claim, Abramson has 
succeeded in both casting doubt on the reasons WPC 
proferred for her termination, and in demonstrating that 
those reasons were vague and inconsistent. In light of this 
evidence, coupled with the "ongoing antagonism" reflected 
in the record, including Speert's change in demeanor after 
Abramson complained of discrimination,21  we find that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The District Court did not find this allegation persuasive, instead 
crediting Speert's explanation that the reason he did not interact with 
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record contains ample proof of a causal connection. 
Therefore, Abramson has presented sufficient evidence to 
meet all three prongs of a prima facie retaliation claim so as 
to withstand summary judgment, and we will reverse the 
District Court's ruling on this claim.22  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
As we stated in Farrell, 
 
       We recognize that different inferences might be drawn 
       from the evidence presented in the record. On 
       summary judgment, however, when viewing the 
       sufficiency of the prima facie case, our role is not to act 
       as fact finder. Instead, we must consider the evidence 
       taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant 
       and determine whether [the plaintiff] can show the 
       causation required . . . . 
 
206 F.3d at 286. Here, there is ample evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could draw inferences establishing all 
three of Abramson's claims. Accordingly, we will REVERSE 
the District Court's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of WPC on Abramson's claims of hostile work 
environment, religious discrimination and retaliation, and 
REMAND for further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abramson was because it was his practice to avoid having any contact 
with anyone being considered for tenure. App. at 115. In doing so, the 
District Court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to Abramson. 
 
22. Needless to say, our opinion should not be interpreted as expressing 
any view as to whether Abramson was in fact subjected to religious 
discrimination or retaliation. We hold only that these questions cannot 
properly be decided at summary judgment and must be submitted to the 
trier of fact. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I write separately to add a brief explanation of my 
understanding of the basis for holding that the summary 
judgment record is sufficient to permit the plaintiff 's 
religious harassment claim to go to trial. Harassment is 
actionable under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination only if it is so severe or pervasive that it 
alters the terms or conditions of the plaintiff 's employment. 
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 
(1998); Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 688-89 (N.J. 
1998). Offensive comments and actions that do not rise to 
this level are insufficient. Id. This is an exacting standard, 
and William Paterson College argues that the evidence in 
this case does not meet it. The College relies on Heitzman 
v. Monmouth County, 728 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999), in which certain anti-Semitic remarks were held 
not to have altered the conditions of employment, and the 
College maintains that "Abramson has not demonstrated 
conduct beyond `the ordinary tribulations of the workplace' 
which is so extreme as to amount to a change in the terms 
and conditions of employment." Appellee's Br. at 40 
(quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). The Court responds to 
the College's argument by saying that "[t]he conduct in the 
instant case could be said to go beyond `simple teasing, 
offhand comments, and [non-serious] isolated incidents.' " 
Maj. Op. at 23 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788) 
(brackets in majority opinion) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted in majority opinion). I agree with the 
Court's statement, but I think that it is necessary to 
explain why the conduct alleged in this case "could be said 
to go beyond . . . ." 
 
The reason is that a reasonable trier of fact could infer 
that officials of the College intentionally pressured the 
plaintiff to violate the dictates of her faith in order to keep 
her job. As the brief of an amicus curiae observes: 
 
       When an employer deliberately reschedules important 
       meetings for Friday afternoons, the message to an 
       Orthodox Jewish employee is clear as a bell. Such 
       rescheduling tells the employee that continued 
       observance of his or her faith will be viewed as 
       incompatible with adequate job performance. Repeated 
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       requests that work be done on Saturdays or Jewish 
       holidays -- or telephone messages left on a Jewish 
       religious holiday demanding an `immediate' response -- 
       are aimed directly at an employee's religious 
       observance. Criticism of an employee's effort to 
       reconcile his or her schedule with the observance of 
       Jewish holidays delivers the message that the religious 
       observer is not welcome at the place of employment. 1 
 
Intentionally pressuring a person to choose between faith 
and career is more "severe" and has a more direct effect on 
the conditions of employment than the sort of offensive 
remarks at issue in Heitzman. While case law provides only 
limited protection for employees whose religious obligations 
conflict with neutral job requirements, see Employment 
Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith , 494 U.S. 
872 (1990); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 
63 (1977), Title VII does not permit an employer to 
manipulate job requirements for the purpose of putting an 
employee to the "cruel choice" between religion and 
employment. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). It is for this reason, in my view, 
that the summary judgment record is sufficient to support 
the plaintiff 's religious harassment claim. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Jewish Commission on Law and 
Public Affairs, at 4. 
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